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Sport is one of the first areas in which enhancement has become commonplace. It is also
one of the first areas in which the use of enhancement technologies has been heavily regulated.
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 This article advances a simple thesis: that the case for permitting enhancement 
outside of sport is often stronger than the case for permitting enhancement in 
sport. Enhancement in sport and enhancement outside of sport are often discussed 
in parallel (President’s Council, 2003; Sandel, 2007), and almost all of those who 
are opposed to (in favour of) enhancement in one arena are also opposed to (in 
favour of) it in the other. Moreover, it has been suggested that the debate about 
enhancement in sport might have important implications for the ethics of 
enhancement in general.1 I will argue that, though there are no doubt certain 
parallels between sport and other areas of human activity, there are also some 
important differences, and these differences must be taken into account in the 
ethical debate on enhancement. 
Before proceeding to the argument, however, I should make some 
clarifications. First, some terminology. I will use ‘sport’ to refer only to 
competitive sports. I do not mean to include activities such as fishing, 
mountaineering, or jogging, insofar as they are non-competitive. And I will 
understand ‘enhancement’ as the use of biomedical technology to achieve goals 
other than the treatment or prevention of disease. Existing examples of 
enhancement might thus include cosmetic surgery, the use of methylphenidate 
(Ritalin) as an aid to study in normal individuals, recreational drug use, and, of 
course, doping in sport. Among the most frequently discussed potential future 
enhancements are alertness enhancement (especially using the drug modafinil), 
enhancement of executive or global cognitive functioning, and normal-life-span 
enhancement.  
Second, I will limit my discussion to the question whether to permit 
enhancement, either within or outside of sport. There are various other interesting 
ethical questions that can be raised about enhancement. Should individuals engage 
in enhancement, given that it is, or is not, permitted? Should scientists attempt to 
develop enhancement technologies? And should policymakers and science 
funders try to promote research on enhancement? I will address these questions 
only where they directly bear on the question whether to permit enhancement. 
Third and last, I will be concerned only to explore the relative strength of 
the arguments for permitting enhancement in sport, and for permitting it outside 
of sport. Thus, my argument will not have direct normative implications: I will 
not attempt to draw any conclusions on whether the arguments for permitting 
enhancement in either domain are decisive. Nevertheless, I hope that my 
comparative project is a worthwhile one, since it has potential methodological 
implications. For example, if the case for permitting enhancement were equally 
strong inside and outside of sport, then one could argue for (or against) permitting 
                                                     
1
 See, for example, President’s Council (2003) at pp. 106-107. 
1
Douglas: Enhancement in Sport, and Enhancement outside Sport
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
enhancement in one area by showing that it should (or should not) be permitted in 
the other. On the other hand, if, as I shall argue, the case for permitting 
enhancement is stronger outside of sport than within it, then showing that 
enhancement should be permitted outside of sport will not establish that it should 
be permitted within sport. Nor will showing that enhancement should be 
prohibited in sport be sufficient to show that it should be prohibited outside sport.  
 
SPORTS DOPING AS A TEST CASE 
 
Ethical debate about enhancement has been prominent in the bioethics literature in 
recent years. Proponents of enhancement note that our lives would plausibly go 
better if we were more intelligent, longer-lived and physically stronger, and they 
deny that there is any good objection to using biomedical technologies to achieve 
these goals (Bostrom and Roache, 2007; Savulescu, 2007a). But opponents 
respond by claiming that enhancement expresses an objectionable desire for 
mastery,2 involves problematic means,3 or has bad effects (either for the enhanced 
individuals, or the societies in which they live).4  
The protagonists in this debate often make reference to enhancement (or 
doping) in sport, and it is not difficult to see why. Sport is, after all, one of the 
first areas of human activity in which enhancement has become common practice. 
There is some evidence that Greek athletes were using stimulants to enhance 
performance as early as the third century BC (Verroken, 2005), and modern 
Olympians were quick to restore the practice of doping: the winner of the 1904 
Olympic marathon took injections of Strychnine during the course of the race 
(Todd, 1987). Only a few years earlier, the first reported death due to sports 
doping had occurred following the 1896 Bordeaux-Paris cycle race (British 
Medical Association, 2002), and it would not be long until the Tour de France was 
hit by its first doping scandal: In 1924, the Pélissier brothers admitted using 
chloroform, cocaine and aspirin over the course of Le Tour (Seaton and Adam, 
2003). These may have been relatively isolated incidents, but from the middle of 
last century, sports doping rapidly became widespread, with the focus initially on 
amphetamines, then on anabolic steroids, and more recently on various forms of 
‘blood doping’ (Verroken, 2005). To give an idea of the extent of doping, a 
member of the 1968 United States track and field team estimated that one third of 
the team had used steroids at a pre-Games training camp (Todd, 1987), and by the 
1988 Seoul Games, a team coach thought that 40% of the US womens track and 
field competitors had used steroids (Dublin, 1990).    
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Sport is also the first area in which enhancement has been heavily 
regulated. The International Amateur Athletics Federation banned doping in 1928, 
and the International Olympic Committee carried out its first compulsory doping 
controls in 1968 (Verroken and Mottram, 2005). Since that time the anti-doping 
movement has gained momentum, with increasing amounts spent on regulation, 
and many commentators now speaking of a ‘war on doping’ and a policy of ‘zero 
tolerance’ (Kayser et al., 2007). This movement may have been motivated in part 
by the widespread public disapproval of doping in sport, for which there is ample 
evidence. In 2007 alone, yellow jersey holder Michael Rasmussen, suspected of 
doping, was boo-ed by spectators during the Tour de France (Brown, 2007); 
Christine Ohuruogu’s celebrations after winning gold in the 400m at the World 
Athletics Championships were tainted by criticism focused on her earlier ban for 
missing three drug tests (Turnbull, 2007; Moore, 2007); and baseballer Barry 
Bonds’ approach to and eventual surpassing of Hank Aaron’s career home run 
record were soured by the widespread belief that his achievements were due in 
part to the use of steroids (Hyde, 2007; Zinser, 2007). There has also been strong 
public reaction to the suggestion that anti-doping rules should be relaxed.5   
Sport has thus served as one of the first testing grounds for enhancement 
technologies, for anti-enhancement regulation, and for public reaction to 
enhancement. It is not surprising, then, that some believe it can also be viewed as 
a testing ground for ethical arguments about whether to permit enhancement.  
Clearly, though, the debate about enhancement in sport will be relevant to the 
debate about enhancement outside sport only to the extent that the considerations 
for and against permitting enhancement are similar in both areas. I will suggest 
that, on at least one important dimension – that of fairness – they are not.  
 
FAIRNESS AND SPORTS DOPING 
 
One of the most frequently cited grounds for prohibiting doping in sport is 
fairness. In its least sophisticated form, the concern is simply that doping is 
cheating. This is obviously often true: when athletes dope, they are, in most cases, 
breaking the rules of their sport.6 Moreover, cheating is surely the paradigmatic 
example of unfairness. The problem with cheating is that it allows the outcome of 
a sporting competition to be determined in part by variations in the willingness of 
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competitors to abide by the rules of the sport. Those willing to flout the rules are 
more likely to succeed than those unwilling to do so. But willingness to flout the 
rules does not seem like the sort of consideration that should determine the 
outcome of a sporting contest – it seems to be an irrelevant factor. And, on one 
view, being determined by irrelevant factors is precisely what makes an outcome 
unfair.7  
But the objection that doping is cheating is no objection to the suggestion 
that doping should be legalized, for we could prevent doping from being cheating 
simply by permitting it (Schneider and Butcher, 2000; Savulescu et al., 2004; 
Foddy and Savulescu, 2007; Nature Editors, 2007). If doping were legal, then the 
outcomes of sporting competitions would no longer be influenced by the 
willingness of competitors to flout the anti-doping rules: there would be no such 
rules.  
Of course, there is another way of dealing with the problem of cheating. 
One could simply try to enforce the anti-doping rules more effectively. This is the 
response favoured by most sporting officials and members of the public. 
Unfortunately, though, many anti-doping rules are quite simply unenforceable 
(Kayser et al., 2005; Savulescu and Foddy, 2008). Athletes may use recently 
developed drugs not known to regulators, take masking agents to normalize their 
test results, or use substances (such as EPO or their own previously-removed 
blood) that occur naturally in the body. Moreover, it is likely that in the not too 
distant future genetic technology will open up a new range of undetectable doping 
practices. Athletes may, for example, be able to inject DNA designed to up-
regulate muscle formation directly into their muscles, thus avoiding abnormal 
blood or urine test results (Foddy and Savulescu, 2007).  It therefore seems highly 
unlikely that regulators could ever stamp out doping entirely. Cheating will 
persist, and outcomes will continue to be unfair. On the other hand, removing the 
anti-doping rules would completely remove the problem of cheating. On this 
basis, it could be argued that, though considerations of fairness militate against 
doping under the current rules, they also militate in favour of changing the rules to 
allow doping – at least, those forms of doping that cannot be effectively regulated 
(Kayser et al., 2007; Savulescu, 2007). 
It should be noted, however, that cheating is not the only possible cause of 
unfairness in the outcomes of sports competitions. On the understanding of 
unfairness adopted above, the outcomes of a sporting competition will be unfair 
whenever they are determined by irrelevant considerations. And willingness to 
flout the rules is surely not the only such consideration in sport. True, by 
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legalizing doping we would negate one irrelevant consideration – willingness to 
flout the rules – but the outcomes of sporting competitions will still be determined 
in part by willingness to dope, and this may also be an irrelevant factor. To settle 
the question whether doping would be unfair even if legal, we need to come to 
some view about what should and what should not determine the results of sports 
competitions. 
At this point, it might be argued that any attempt to justify anti-doping 
regulation by reference to fairness is bound to fail, since sport is in any case 
irretrievably unfair. Norman Fost, Julian Savulescu and others have defended this 
pessimistic line by noting that, since those with certain arbitrary genetic traits will 
always have advantages over those who lack them, the playing field will never be 
level (Fost, 1986; Savulescu et al., 2004; Kayser et al., 2005; Mehlman et al., 
2005). But, at least on the understanding of fairness introduced above, it is an 
open question whether it is unfair for genetic traits to influence sporting 
outcomes. Whether it is unfair will depend on whether genes should influence 
sporting outcomes. It may be true that in some areas of human activity – the 
criminal justice system, for example – we think that genetics should not determine 
outcomes. But we cannot simply assume that the same goes for sport. Once again, 
what seems to be called for is some account of what should and should not 
determine sporting outcomes.   
 
WHAT SHOULD DETERMINE OUTCOMES IN SPORT? 
 
On one view, sometimes described as the ‘Athenian’ ideal, the outcomes of sports 
competitions should be determined solely by natural ability. Indeed, one could 
argue that we value sport in part because it serves as a test of natural ability. But if 
this view is correct, then all sports competitions are grossly unfair, for there is no 
sport in which natural ability is the only determinant of success. Most obviously, 
success in all sports is determined by effort (both in training, and during 
competition) as well as natural ability (Fost, 1986). Moreover, there has been no 
serious attempt to mitigate the effects of effort on outcomes in sport. In fact, those 
who succeed through making particularly great efforts are normally subject to 
special praise. This suggests that we do not really value sport as a test of natural 
ability – at least, not as a test of natural ability alone.  
An alternative view is that the outcomes of sporting competitions should 
be determined solely by effort. But again, this view seems at odds with our actual 
beliefs and practices. In most sports, no serious attempts have been made to 
mitigate the obvious effects of natural ability on outcomes, and those who succeed 
in large measure as a result of their extraordinary natural abilities are, again, 
normally the subjects of praise, not disapproval.  
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Much more plausible than either of the views mentioned above is a view 
which combines the two, holding that the outcomes of sport should be determined 
by natural ability and effort; we value sport because it serves as a test of these two 
characteristics (Todd, 1987).  
One might, again, note that if this view is correct, then virtually all sport 
competitions are unfair, since outcomes are typically determined in part by factors 
such as quality of coaching and equipment, access to training facilities and, more 
generally, the wealth and technological development of the society in which an 
athlete lives (Fost, 1986; Savulescu et al., 2004; Équilibre, 2007; Kayser et al., 
2007). Even in the least technology-friendly sports, such as running and 
swimming, some relatively high-tech equipment, training schedules, and 
nutritional supplements are permitted, and access to these technologies may thus 
affect outcomes. However, there is some evidence that we regard the influence of 
technology and other external-to-the-athlete factors as a concession to expedience 
(or, in some cases, athlete safety), not as an expression of what we think sports 
should test, or of what we value about sport. For example, officials do often 
attempt to mitigate the effect of external factors on sporting outcomes. An 
obvious example of such mitigation comes from Olympic yachting, where the 
design of boats is (in many classes) strictly regulated to ensure that those with 
access to superior yacht-building technology have little advantage over others. 
Further evidence can be found in our own attitudes to sportspeople who do rely on 
such factors, and who succeed as a result: those who achieve great success in 
sport largely as a result of external technological or financial advantages are often 
not praised and admired in the same way as those who succeed through natural 
ability and effort. It appears, then, that we sometimes do regard such external 
factors as inappropriate determinants of sporting outcomes, even if we are 
prepared to accept that some influence of technology must be tolerated.   
Of course, the fact that people sometimes regard external factors as 
inappropriate determinants of sporting outcomes does not show that they ought to 
regard them as such. Some have argued that seeking to improve performance 
using technology should be regarded as part of what sport is about – part of the 
spirit of sport. Julian Savulescu and Bennett Foddy (2004) write:  
 
We can choose what kind of competitor to be, not just through training, but through 
biological manipulation – that is, by taking drugs. Far from being against the spirit 
of sport, biological manipulation embodies the human spirit – the capacity to change 
ourselves on the basis of reason and judgment. When we exercise our reason, we do 
what only humans have the ability to do.8 
  
If the claim here is simply that there is nothing wrong with sports which embrace 
a role for technology, then it is difficult to disagree with. There are, of course, 
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already many sports where technology is perhaps the major determinant of 
outcomes. Consider, for example, Formula One racing. This sport is arguably 
intended more as a test for technology than as a test of the efforts and natural 
abilities of competitors.9   
On the other hand, if the claim is meant to be that all sports ought to 
embrace a role for technology, then it is less plausible. Why should we not have 
some sports that test mainly effort and natural ability, and others that test 
technology? Arguably, part of what we appreciate about the diversity of sport is 
that different sports test different things. It is true that technology need not be 
regarded as an inappropriate determinant of sporting outcomes. But nor need it be 
regarded as an appropriate determinant. We can choose, on a sport-by-sport basis, 
whether and to what extent we want sporting outcomes to be influenced by 
technology. 
Suppose, then, that having reflected on whether technology should be 
allowed to determine outcomes in sport, we have decided that, for some sports, it 
should not play any greater role than is necessary. One can see the outlines of a 
fairness-based argument for the prohibition of doping in these sports. If doping 
were permitted, athletes would presumably dope to a greater degree, on average, 
than they do at present. Thus, absolute sporting outcomes (time taken, distance 
jumped, targets hit et cetera) would, to a greater degree than currently, be 
attributable to technological influence. Moreover, since different competitors 
would no doubt have different access to doping technology, relative outcomes 
(placings, rankings) would also be determined to a significant extent by 
technology. This would be a particular problem if doping technologies were 
expensive.  
However, it remains an open question whether a strict anti-doping policy – 
such as that currently in place in most sports – would fare any better than a 
permissive one. Strict regulation of doping probably does reduce the effect of 
technology on absolute outcomes. But it is not clear that effects on absolute 
outcomes raise any fairness related issues. The introduction of running shoes and 
graphite tennis racquets arguably affected absolute outcomes in athletics and 
tennis, but since it did obviously affect relative outcomes, we do not regard it as 
raising questions of fairness. What seems important, from the point of view of 
fairness, is the extent to which technology affects relative outcomes. And here, it 
is not clear that a strong anti-doping policy would do any better than a permissive 
policy: since drug tests will always be imperfect, those with the best doping 
technology may be able to evade anti-doping regulation whereas those with 
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inferior technology may be caught (Kayser et al., 2007; Savulescu and Foddy, 
2008). Thus, differences in access to technology can also have a very marked 
effect on outcomes under a strict anti-doping regime. 
The advocate of anti-doping regulation may, however, make one further 
manoeuvre. She may point out that, as well as caring about relative sporting 
outcomes within individual competitions, we also care about relative outcomes 
across competitions occurring at different places and, crucially, different times. 
We like to be able to compare the performance of Tyson Gay with that of Jesse 
Owens, or the performance of Barry Bonds with that of Babe Ruth. Thus, if we 
are to take seriously the view that sporting outcomes ought not to be determined 
by external factors, we should try to equalise these external factors not merely 
within individual competitions, but also across competitions occurring in different 
places and times. And since past sportspeople did not have access to doping 
technologies, some might feel that modern day competitors should also be 
deprived these technologies. 
I doubt that many people assign over-riding importance to ensuring fairness 
of outcomes across time. For example, few people object to the technological 
improvements that have been made to running shoes, racing bicycles or skis over 
the last century, even though these make comparison across time difficult. When 
considering whether to allow some new technology into a sport, we are prepared 
to sacrifice some inter-temporal fairness in order to reap other benefits.  
However, it remains true that there is a cost, in terms of inter-temporal 
fairness, to adopting these technologies. And there would be a similar cost to 
permitting doping: past competitors in most sports did not have access to 
enhancement technologies, so there is at least some fairness-based reason to 
deprive current athletes of those technologies. Moreover, as we have seen, there is 
also the possibility – though this is partly an empirical question – that permitting 
doping might increase unfairness within competitions due to differing access to 
doping technology. We may conclude, then, that the prospect of a permissive 
approach to sports doping does raise some fairness-based concerns, though it is 
far from clear that those concerns count decisively against such a policy.   
 
WHAT SHOULD DETERMINE OUTCOMES OUTSIDE SPORT?  
  
Are similar fairness-based concerns raised by the suggestion that we should 
permit enhancement outside of sport? Plausibly, the answer to this question will 
depend on what kind of non-sporting activity we consider. I wish to focus here on 
two realms of human activity: the arts (by which I mean to include literature, 
music, and the visual arts), and the economy. These two areas have been chosen 
to bring out two different ways in which non-sporting activities may differ from 
sport.  
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Consider first the arts. Like sport, art is one area in which enhancement 
technologies are already in use. For example, some musicians use beta-blockers to 
calm their nerves before performances (Tindall, 2004). Moreover, it seems likely 
that, as in sport, such technologies may give those who use them a better chance 
at producing better ‘artistic outcomes’. It would not be surprising if musicians 
who dampened their pre-performance nerves with beta-blockers gave better 
performances, on average, than those who did not. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that this is the case (Brantigan et al., 1982). But would the suggestion that musical 
performance enhancers should be permitted be susceptible to the same fairness-
based objections as are advanced against allowing drugs in sport? 
The first thing to note here is that the circumstances in which we value art 
as a test of the artist’s abilities are rather limited. We can imagine a guitar 
enthusiast who appreciates the music of Jimi Hendrix largely for what it shows 
about his guitar-playing ability.10 And there are special circumstances – for 
example, auditions and artistic competitions – in which art clearly does function 
as a test. But much of the time, many of us value the arts primarily for the 
outcomes they produce – the beauty of a painting, the quality of a piece of music, 
the poignancy of a drama or the humour of a comedy – as well as the meanings 
they express. And though, in such cases, we may still care about what abilities the 
artist drew on in producing the artwork – say, because this is relevant to 
interpreting the art’s meaning – it does not follow that we are valuing art because 
of what it reveals about these abilities: we need not be regarding art as a test. On 
the other hand, it seems plausible that when we value competitive sports, we 
almost always do so in part because of their testing function: their aesthetic appeal 
or meaning is at most a secondary consideration.  
This difference between sport and the arts is of crucial importance in 
evaluating the possible unfairness of enhancement. The fairness-based objection 
to enhancement in sport relied on the view that use of enhancement technology is 
an irrelevant determinant of sporting outcomes. But the analogous objection fails 
to get a strong grip on enhancement in the arts for the simple reason that we are 
generally quite reluctant to write-off any determinant of artistic achievement as 
irrelevant. And this may be because, not valuing art primarily as a test, we have 
less need to worry about the possible interference from irrelevant determinants in 
that domain.  
Consider now another realm of human activity: the economy. As with 
sport and the arts, enhancement promises to play an important role in determining 
the outcomes of economic activity. For example, future people may be able to 
cognitively enhance themselves in ways that will increase their economic 
productivity, and thus their wealth and income. Imagine an investment banker 
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with enhanced numerical skills, a social worker with enhanced empathetic 
abilities, or a physically enhanced builder.  
Again, we can ask: would there be any fairness-based objection to 
allowing economic outcomes (for example, income and wealth) to be determined 
in part by the use of enhancement technology? And again, we might begin by 
noting that – like art, and unlike sport – the economy is not normally regarded as a 
test of individual abilities. We value the economy for the benefits it brings us, not 
for what economic outcomes tell us about the characteristics of individual 
economic agents. We might thus expect that, as with art, we will be largely 
indifferent to whether technology determines economic outcomes, being instead 
primarily concerned with what those outcomes are. 
In fact, however, this is not quite the case. Many people have strong views 
about what individual characteristics should determine a person’s income or 
wealth. Presumably this is because economic outcomes are so important in 
determining a person’s quality (and quantity) of life, and perhaps also because 
they are open to social manipulation in a way that sporting and artistic 
achievements are not. One’s contribution to society or the market value of one’s 
work are two prominent candidates as suitable determinants of economic 
outcomes. One’s need, effort, desert, merit, choices or sacrifices are others. Note, 
moreover, that many of these views would rule out any role for enhancement 
technology in determining economic outcomes. If my income should be 
determined by my effort, for example, then it should not be determined by my use 
of productivity-increasing enhancement technologies, since these are unrelated to 
my effort. In this respect, then, the economy appears to be more like sport than it 
is like art; we do care about what affects outcomes, and in particular, we may 
regard the use of enhancement technology as an irrelevant determinant of 
outcomes.  
There remain, however, some important differences between sporting and 
economic activity. Firstly, insofar as we are concerned about what determines 
economic outcomes, these concerns relate only to the distribution of income and 
wealth across contemporaries. Many people now enjoy economic advantages that 
far exceed those enjoyed by our eighteenth century predecessors. But no one 
would object to this discrepancy on the grounds, say, that we are no more needy 
or deserving than them. Technological improvements have enabled us to reap 
greater economic benefits, and we do not think that there is anything importantly 
unfair about this.  
Secondly, and relatedly, though we are concerned about what determines 
the distribution of income and wealth across contemporaries, that concern is 
normally thought to be subject to an important constraint: if some change in the 
economic ground rules will result in one person being made absolutely better off, 
economically, without anyone else being made absolutely worse-off (either 
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economically or in any other way), there can be no objection to that change.11 
Thus, though we may think that economic benefits ought, in general, to be 
distributed according to desert, there can be no objection to a non-deserving 
person obtaining a higher income – say, through cognitive enhancement – if this 
has no absolute negative effect on anyone else. Thus, issues of fairness arise in the 
economy only in those cases where one person’s having greater income or wealth 
causes another person to be absolutely worse off.  In competitive sport, however, 
we may care if one person benefits from some irrelevant advantage even where 
this has not absolute effect on others. The change will still affect relative 
outcomes, and will thus still interfere with the sport’s testing function. 
There are, then, two respects in which enhancement in economic activity 
is less susceptible to fairness-based objections than enhancement in sport. First, 
enhancement in the economy does not raise issues of fairness between present and 
past people. And second, since not all cases of enhancement in the economy will 
make others worse off, not all will raise issues of fairness even between 
contemporaries.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
We have seen that one of the most prominent objections to permitting 
enhancement in sport – that it would lead to unfair outcomes – does not apply, or 
does not apply with equal force, in two non-sporting areas: the arts, and the 
economy. The feature of sport which gives rise to this conclusion is that it may, at 
least in some cases, plausibly be regarded as a test of certain human abilities (such 
as effort and natural ability). To a large extent we may value sports like athletics 
and swimming for what they tell us about those abilities. No similar claim seems 
as plausible regarding the arts or the economy. We arguably value those areas of 
human activity more for their outcomes than for what they reveal about their 
participants. Other things being equal, then, there will be a stronger case for 
permitting enhancement in these areas than in some sports.  
Other things might, of course, not be equal. There may be reasons for 
permitting enhancement in sport that are peculiar to sport, or reasons against 
permitting enhancement outside sport that do not apply to sport. But I am not 
aware of any good argument for the existence of such reasons. As I noted at the 
outset, it is commonly assumed that enhancement in sport raises by and large the 
same ethical issues as enhancement outside of sport. Thus, having seen that there 
is one dimension – that of fairness – on which enhancement outside of sport 
seems less problematic than enhancement inside it, we may tentatively conclude 
                                                     
11
 Arguably, our acceptance of this constraint explains why we find it unconcerning that we are 
better off, in various ways, than our predecessors: our being better off does not in any way harm 
them.   
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that, all things considered, there are stronger reasons to permit enhancement in the 
arts and the economy than in certain sports. 
Whether the same conclusion holds for other non-sporting areas of human 
activity is an interesting question, but not one that I can pursue here. However, my 
feeling is that sport is relatively unusual in being valued largely for its function as 
a test, with most areas being more outcome-focussed, like the arts or the economy. 
Clearly, there are some exceptions to this generalisation. Academic examinations 
and job interviews are intended as tests. For the most part, however, the 
generalisation seems to hold.  
My argument does not yield any immediate conclusions about whether we 
should permit enhancement either inside or outside of sport. But it does have 
methodological implications for how to reason about these matters. Specifically, if 
one can establish that enhancement ought to be banned outside of sport, then one 
will have established at least a prima facie case for banning enhancement in sport, 
where a permissive policy would raise additional issues of fairness. But 
demonstrating that enhancement ought to be banned in sport may lend no support 
to the view that it ought also to be banned outside of sport, since the case against 
enhancement in sport may be based on fairness-related issues that are peculiar to 
sport. On the other hand, arguing for a permissive approach to enhancement in 
sport may be a persuasive strategy for defending a similar approach to 
enhancement outside of sport, where fewer issues of fairness arise. But defending 
a permissive policy on enhancement outside of sport may lend no support to a 
permissive policy on sports doping. 
Of course, none of this shows that others have been wrong to draw an 
analogy between the ethics of enhancement in sport and the ethics of enhancement 
outside sport. Clearly, there are parallels. I have simply tried to provide one 
reason for exercising caution in drawing them.  
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